

PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

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OUTLINE

- POINT OF DEPARTURE
- HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION
- CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT
- SYNTHESIS
- APPLICATION
- WRAP-UP
- EPILOGUE

PURPOSE

- To make manifest the nature of Moral-Mental-Physical Conflict
- To discern a Pattern for Successful Operations
- To help generalize Tactics and Strategy
- To find a basis for Grand Strategy

POINT OF DEPARTURE

AIR-to-AIR

GENERALIZATION

- Need fighter that can both lose energy and gain energy more quickly while outturning an adversary.
- In other words, suggests a fighter that can pick and choose engagement opportunities -- yet has fast transient ("buttonhook") characteristics that can be used to either force an overshoot by an attacker or stay inside a hard turning defender.

IDEA EXPANSION

- Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win, we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries -- or better yet, get inside adversary's Observation-Orientatation-Decision-Action time cycle or loop.
- Why? Such activity will make us appear ambiguous (unpredictable) thereby generate confusion and disorder among our adversaries -- since our adversaries will be unable to generate mental images or pictures that agree with the menacing as well as faster transient rhythm or patterns they are competing against.

EXAMPLES

- Blitzkrieg vs Maginot Line Mentality (1940)
- F-86 vs MiG-15 (1951 - 53)
- Israeli Raid (1976)

NEW CONCEPTION

Action

- Exploit operations and weapons that:
 - Generate a rapidly changing environment (quick/clear observations, orientation and decisions, fast tempo, fast transient maneuvers, quick kill)
 - Inhibit an adversary's capacity to adapt to such an environment (cloud or distort his observations, orientation, and decisions)

Idea

- Simultaneously compress own time and stretch-out adversary time to generate a favorable mismatch in time/ability to shape and adapt to change

Goal

- Collapse adversary's system into confusion and disorder by causing him to over and under react to activity that appears simultaneously menacing as well as ambiguous, chaotic or misleading.

A-to-A and A-to-G

RECIPE FOR GENERATING CONFUSION AND DISORDER

Observations

- Quick/Clear Scanning Sensors
- Suppressed/distorted signatures

Activity

- Fire
 - Quick shoot fire control systems and high speed weapons
- Movement
 - High Speed (supercruise)
 - Rapid energy gain and rapid energy loss coupled with hi turn rates and lo turn radii
 - Hi pitch rates/Hi roll rates/Hi yaw rates coupled with ease of control

HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION

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GOAL

- Improve our capacity for independent action

This may mean we need to


- Deprive our adversary of his capacity for independent action.

QUESTIONS


- How do we realize such a goal by waging war?
- Does history give any insight or suggest any useful pattern?

HISTORICAL PATTERN

SUN TZU -- "THE ART OF WAR" -- AROUND 400 BC



HISTORICAL PATTERN



* Cheng/Ch'i maneuver schemes were employed by early commanders to expose adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses (a'la Cheng) for exploitation and decisive stroke (via Ch'i).

HISTORICAL PATTERN

Keeping in mind the ideas of Sun Tzu and our comments about Early Commanders, let's take a look at an early tactical theme and some battle (grand tactical) situations to gain a feel for the different ways the Cheng/Ch'i game has been (and can be) played.

HISTORICAL PATTERN


Tactical Theme (from about 300 BC to 1400 AD)

- Light troops (equipped with bows, javelins, light swords, etc.) perform reconnaissance, screening, and swirling hit-and-run actions to:
 - Unmask enemy dispositions and activities.
 - Cloud/distort own dispositions and activities.
 - Confuse, disorder enemy operations.
- Heavy troops (equipped with lances, bows, swords, etc.) protected by armor and shields:
 - Charge and smash thinned-out/scattered or disordered/bunched-up enemy formations generated by interaction with light troops or
 - Menace enemy formations to hold them in tight, or rigid, arrays thereby make them vulnerable to missiles of swirling light troops.
- Light and heavy troops in appropriate combination pursue, envelop, and mop-up isolated remnants of enemy host.


Idea

- Employ maneuver action by light troops with thrust action of heavy troops to confuse, break-up, and smash enemy formations.

BATTLE OF MARATHON
(490 BC)



BATTLE OF LEUCTRA
(371 BC)



THEBANS


V. YE. SAVKIN -- "THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONAL ART AND TACTICS" -- 1972

PAGES 7 and 203


Battle of Leuctra (371 BC)

At this battle Frederick Engels (according to Savkin) credited Epaminondas for having first discovered and employed an unequal distribution of forces across a front as basis to concentrate forces for the main attack at the decisive point.


BATTLE OF ARBELA
(331 BC)



BATTLE OF ARBELA
(331 BC)




BATTLE OF CANNAE
(216 BC)



OPENING PHASE

BATTLE OF CANNAE
(216 BC)



FINAL PHASE


IMPRESSIONS

- Battles of Marathon, Leuctra, Arbela, and Cannae emphasize an unequal distribution as basis for local superiority and decisive leverage to collapse adversary resistance.


on the other hand

- The discussion (so far) provides little insight on how these battle arrangements and follow-on maneuvers play upon moral factors such as doubt, fear, anxiety, etc.

HISTORICAL PATTERN
CHINGIS KHAN AND THE MONGOLS



MONGAL STRATEGIC MANEUVER
(1219-1220)



500 MILES

HERAT

? - RAISES NAGGING QUESTION - ?

Even though outnumbered, why were Mongols able to maneuver in widely scattered arrays without being defeated separately or in detail?

HISTORICAL PATTERN
CHINGIS KHAN AND THE MONGOLS

Message

- By exploiting superior leadership, intelligence, communications, and mobility as well as by playing upon adversary's fears and doubts via propaganda and terror, Mongols operated inside adversary observation-orientation-decision-action loops.


Result

- Outnumbered Mongols created impressions of terrifying strength--by seeming to come out of nowhere yet be everywhere.

hence,

- Subversive propaganda, clever stratagems, fast breaking maneuvers, and calculated terror not only created vulnerabilities and weaknesses but also played upon moral factors that drain-away resolve, produce panic, and bring about collapse.

BATTLE OF LEUTHEN
(1757)



HISTORICAL PATTERN

18th CENTURY THEORETICIANS

- Saxe
- Bourcet
- Guibert
- Du Teil

THEME

- Plan with several branches
- Mobility/fluidity of force
- Cohesion
- Dispersion and concentration
- Operate on a line to threaten alternative objectives
- Concentrate direct artillery fire on key points to be forced

Action

- Napoleon was deeply influenced by the ideas of the above men. In early campaigns (as a general) he applied these ideas of ambiguity, deception, and rapid/easy movement to surprise and successfully defeat fractions of superior forces. In later campaigns (as emperor) he relied increasingly on massed direct artillery fire, dense infantry columns, and heavy cavalry going against regions of strong resistance -- at an eventually crippling cost in casualties.
- American Colonists, Spanish and Russian Guerrillas, in unexpected ways, used environmental background (terrain, weather, darkness, etc.) and mobility/fluidity as basis for dispersion and concentration to harass, confuse, and contribute toward the defeat of the British and French under Napoleon.

IMPRESSION

The ideas of Sun Tzu, Saxe, Bourcet, and Guibert seem to be at home with either Regular or Guerrilla Warfare.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

NAPOLEON'S ART OF WAR

Revolutionary Army Gifts to Napoleon

- Moral and physical energy of citizen-soldiers and new leaders generated by the revolution and magnified by successes against invading allied armies.
- Subdivision of army into smaller self-contained but mutually supporting units (divisions).
- Ability to travel light and live-off countryside without extensive baggage, many supply wagons, and slow-moving resupply efforts.
- Rapid march associated with "120" instead of the standard "70" steps per minute.
- Discontinued adherence to 1791 Drill Regulations pertaining to the well regulated and stereotype use of column and line formations for movement and fighting.

Beneficial Asymmetry

- Mobility/fluidity of force dramatically better than that possessed by potential adversaries.

? - Raises Question - ?

How did Napoleon exploit this superior mobility/fluidity of force?

HISTORICAL PATTERN

NAPOLEON'S ART OF WAR

General Features

- Plan and Resolution
Evolve plan with appropriate variations each of which correspond to probable or possible actions. Employ Intelligence/Recce units (spies, agents, cavalry, etc.) in predetermined directions to eliminate or confirm hypotheses concerning enemy actions thereby reduce uncertainty and simplify own plan as well as uncover adversary plans and intentions.
- Security
Generate misinformation, devise stratagems, and alter composition of major formations to confuse and baffle enemy agents, spies, etc. Employ screens of cavalry, infantry or both and make use of natural features such as terrain, weather, and darkness to mask dispositions and cloak movements against enemy observation.
- Strategic Dispersion and Tactical Concentration
Expand then contract intervals between force components in an irregular and rapid fashion to cloud/distort strategic maneuvers yet quickly focus tactical effort for a convergent blow at the decisive point.
- Vigorous Offensive Action
Seize initiative at the outset by attacking enemy with an evershifting kaleidoscope of (strategic) moves and diversions in order to upset his actions and unsettle his plans thereby psychologically unbalance him and keep initiative throughout.

Strategic Theme

- Use unified (or single) line of operations as basis for mutual support between separated adjacent and follow-on units.
- Menace (and try to seize) adversary communications to isolate his forces from outside support or reinforcement and force him to fight under unfavorable circumstances by the following actions:
 - Employ fraction of force to hold or divert adversary attention--by feints, demonstrations, pinning maneuvers, etc.
 - Exploit "exterior maneuvers" against exposed flanks or "interior" maneuvers" thru a weak front to place (bulk of) forces in adversary's flank and rear.
- Set-up supporting "centers (bases) of operation" and alternative lines of communication and keep (at least some) safe and open as basis to maintain freedom of maneuver.

AIM

Destroy enemy army

HISTORICAL PATTERN

NAPOLEON'S ART OF WAR

Early Tactics

"The action was opened by a cloud of sharpshooters, some mounted, some on foot, who were sent forward to carry out a general rather than a minutely-regulated mission; they proceeded to harass the enemy, escaping from his superior numbers by their mobility, from the effect of his cannon by their dispersal. They were constantly relieved to ensure that the fire did not slacken, and they also received considerable reinforcement to increase their over-all effect. ...

Once the chink in the foe's armour had been revealed, ... the horse artillery would gallop up and open fire with canister at close range. The attacking force would meantime be moving up in the indicated direction, the infantry advancing in column, the cavalry in regiments or squadrons, ready to make its presence felt anywhere or everywhere as required. Then, when the hail of enemy bullets or cannon balls began to slacken. ... The soldiers would begin to run forward, those in the front ranks crossing their bayonets, as the drums beat the charge; the sky would ring to a thousand battle-cries constantly repeated: "En avant. En avant. Vive la Republique."

Later Tactics

"At the outset, a heavy bombardment would be loosed against the enemy formations, causing fearful losses if they failed to seek shelter, and generally lowering their power of resistance. Under cover of this fire, swarms of voltigeurs would advance to within musketry range and add a disconcerting "nuisance" element by sniping at officers and the like. This preliminary phase would be followed by a series of heavy cavalry and infantry attacks. The secret of these was careful timing and coordination. The first cavalry charges were designed to defeat the hostile cavalry and compel the enemy infantry to form squares," thereby reduce fire in any one direction and enable the columns to get to close grips before the enemy could resume his linear formation. The infantry (deployed or not) and accompanying horse artillery would then blaze a gap in the enemy formation and finally the cavalry would sweep forward, again, to exploit the breakthrough.

Essential Point

Early tactics, without apparent design, operate in a fluid, adaptable manner to uncover, expand and exploit adversary weaknesses while later tactics emphasize massed firepower and stereotyped formations working formally together to smash adversary strength.

HISTORICAL PATTERN
NAPOLÉON'S ART OF WAR

Critique

- Napoleon exploited ambiguity, deception, and mobility at the Strategic level,
- whereas,
- He increasingly emphasized formal battering ram methods and deemphasized loose, irregular methods (e.g. skirmishers) at the Tactics level--via a heavy handed return to the 1791 Drill Regulations.

Why?

- Napoleon emphasized the Conduct of War from the top down. He created and exploited Strategic success to procure Grand Tactical and Tactical success.
- To support this concept he set-up a highly centralized command and control system (Napoleon's so-called unity of command) which resulted in strength smashing into strength by increasingly unimaginative, formalized and predictable actions at lower and lower levels.

Result

- Strategic Maneuvers ambiguous and deceiving prior to tactical concentration. After concentration "maneuvers" stereotype and obvious.
- hence
- Tactical "maneuvers" could not easily procure the victory because of their obvious, predictable nature.

WHICH UNVEILS

The Napoleonic Spirit

Strategic "fog" followed by stereotype and ruinous tactical assaults.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ -- "ON WAR" -- 1832

Character/Nature of War

- War is an act of policy ... therefore the intensity of violence (associated with war) is either directed or tolerated by that policy.
- Duel or act of human interaction directed against an animate object that reacts.
- Uncertainty of information acts as an impediment to vigorous activity.
- Psychological/Moral forces and effects (danger, intelligence, emotional factors, ...) either impede or stimulate activity.
- Friction (interaction of many factors including those above) impedes activity.
- Genius (harmonious balance of mind/temperament that permit one to overcome friction and excel at the complex activity of war) changes the nature and magnifies the scope of operations.

Strategy

- Exhaust enemy by influencing him to increase his expenditure of effort.
- Seek out those centers of gravity upon which all power/movement depend and if possible trace them back to a single one.
- Compress all effort, against those centers, into the fewest possible actions.
- Subordinate all minor, or secondary, actions as much as possible.
- Move with the utmost speed.
- Seek the major battle (with superiority of number and conditions) that will promise a decisive victory.

AIM

- "Render enemy powerless" -- with emphasis on "the destruction of his armed forces."

HISTORICAL PATTERN

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ -- "ON WAR" -- 1832

Critique

- Clausewitz overemphasized Decisive Battle and underemphasized Strategic Manuever.
- Clausewitz emphasized method and routine at the Tactical Level.

Why?

- Clausewitz was concerned with trying to overcome, or reduce, friction/uncertainty. He failed to address the idea of magnifying adversary friction/uncertainty.
- Clausewitz was concerned with trying to exhaust adversary by influencing him to increase his expenditure of effort. He failed to address, or develop, the idea of trying to paralyze adversary by denying him the opportunity to expend effort.
- Clausewitz incorrectly stated: "a center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely" -- then argued that this is the place where the blows must be aimed and where the decision should be reached. He failed to develop idea of generating many non-cooperative centers of gravity by striking at those vulnerable, yet critical, tendons, connections, and activities that permit a center of gravity to exist.

? Raises Question ?

What does all this mean?

HISTORICAL PATTERN

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ -- "ON WAR" -- 1832

Message

Clausewitz did not see that many non-cooperative, or conflicting, centers of gravity paralyze adversary by denying him the opportunity to operate in a directed fashion, hence they impede vigorous activity and magnify friction.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ -- "ON WAR" -- 1832

Message

Clausewitz did not see that many non-cooperative, or conflicting, centers of gravity paralyze adversary by denying him the opportunity to operate in a directed fashion, hence they impede vigorous activity and magnify friction.

Likely Result

Operations end in a "bloodbath" -- via the well regulated, stereotype tactics and unimaginative battles of attrition suggested by Clausewitz.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

JOMINI--1861

Secret of Success

" . . . the narratives of Frederick the Great commenced to initiate me in the secret which had caused him to gain the miraculous victory of Leuthen. I perceived that this secret consisted in the very simple maneuver of carrying the bulk of his forces upon a single wing of the hostile army . . ., I found again, afterwards, the same cause in the first successes of Napoleon in Italy, which gave me the idea that by applying, through strategy, to the whole chess-table of a war this same principle which Frederick had applied to battles, we should have the key to all the science of war."

HISTORICAL PATTERN

JOMINI--"THE ART OF WAR"--1836

Key Idea and Supporting Mechanism

- Generalize oblique order associated with Battles at Leuctra and Leuthen.
- Divide theater and its subordinate components (zones, fronts, positions etc.) into three subdivisions--a center and two wings--as basis to apply the Leuctra/Leuthen concept in Strategic and Grand Tactical maneuvers.
- Set-up base(s) of operations and (alternative) lines of communication for freedom to shape and shift flow/direction of operations as basis to apply Leuctra/Leuthen Strategic and Grand Tactical maneuvers.

Strategy/Grand Tactics

- By free and rapid movements carry bulk of the forces (successively) against fractions of the enemy.
- Strike in the most decisive direction-- That is to say against the center or one wing or the center and one wing simultaneously.
- If possible, seize adversary's communications and force him to fight on a reverse front, by using bulk of forces to hit his flank and take him in the rear -- while using detachments, as needed, to block the arrival of reinforcements as well as draw his attention elsewhere.
- If the enemy's forces are too much extended pierce his center to divide and crush his fractions separately.
- To outflank and turn (envelop) a wing, hit enemy in the flank and also contain him at the front.
- An attack may be made simultaneously upon both extremities but not when the attacking force is equal or inferior (numerically) to the enemy.

AIM

To make evident a "secret" for success in war.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

JOMINI -- "THE ART OF WAR" -- 1836

Critique

- Preoccupation with form of operations, spatial arrangement of bases, formal orders of battle, and tactical formations.
- Lack of appreciation for the use of loose, irregular swarms of guerrillas and skirmishers to mask own dispositions, activities, and intentions as well as confuse and disorder enemy operations.

Likely Result

- Operations become stereotyped -- unless one can appreciate Jomini's ideas outside their formal underpinnings.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

Napoleon - Clausewitz - Jomini

Key Point

Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini did not appreciate importance of loose, irregular tactical arrangements and activities to mask or distort own presence and intentions as well as confuse and disorder adversary operations.

? Why ?

HISTORICAL PATTERN

Napoleon - Clausewitz - Jomini

Key Point

Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini did not appreciate importance of loose, irregular tactical arrangements and activities to mask or distort own presence and intentions as well as confuse and disorder adversary operations.

? Why ?

Major Flaw

Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini viewed the Conduct of War and related operations in essentially one direction--from the top down--emphasizing adaptability at the top and regularity at the bottom.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

19th Century Technology

- Railroad/Telegraph
- Quick Fire Artillery
- Machine Gun
- Repeating Rifle
- Barbed Wire
- Trenches

Early Trends

- Emphasis toward massed firepower and large armies supported by rail logistics.
- Increased emphasis on a holding defense and flanking or wide turning maneuvers into adversary rear to gain a decision
- Use of frontal assaults by infantry supported by artillery barrages against regions of strong resistance

Result

- Huge armies, and massed firepower and other vast needs supported through a narrow fixed logistics network suppressed ambiguity, deception, and mobility hence surprise of any operation.


KEY POINTS

- The mobilization of large armies and the massing of enormous supplies through a narrow logistics network -- magnified by the presence of Napoleon's tactical rigidity, Clausewitz's battle philosophy, and Jomini's formalism -- "telegraphed" any punch hence minimized the possibility of exploiting ambiguity, deception, and mobility to generate surprise for a decisive edge.
- In this sense, technology was being used as a crude club that generated frightful and debilitating casualties on all sides during the:
 - American Civil War (1861-65)
 - Austro-Prussian War (1866)
 - Franco-Prussian War (1870)
 - Boer War (1899-1902)
 - Russo-Japanese War (1904-05)
 - World War I (1914-18)

WORLD WAR I

- PLANS AND EXECUTION
- STAGNATION
- FINALE

SCHLIEFFEN STRATEGIC MANEUVER (1914)



WORLD WAR I

Action

- Offensives conducted on wide frontages--emphasizing few, rather than many, harmonious yet independent thrusts
- Evenness of advance maintained to protect flanks and provide artillery support as advance makes headway
- Reserves thrown in whenever attack held up--against regions or points of strong resistance

Reaction

- Defense organized into depth of successive belts of fortified terrain
- Massed artillery and machinegun fire designed to arrest and pin down attacker
- Counter-attack to win back lost ground

Result

- Stagnation and enormous attrition since advances made generally as expected along paths of hardened resistance because of dependence upon railroads and choice of tactics of trying to reduce strong points by massed firepower and infantry.

WORLD WAR I

A WAY OUT

Idea

- Infiltration Tactics
- Guerrilla Tactics

Authors

- Capt Laffargue
- Gen Von Hutier?
- Gen Ludendorff
- T.E. Lawrence
- Paul Von Lettow-Vorbeck

WORLD WAR I

Infiltration Tactics

Action

- Brief but intense artillery bombardment, that includes gas and smoke shell, to disrupt/suppress defenses and obscure the assault.
- Stosstruppen (small teams or squads of thrusttroops each equipped with a light machinegun and mortar) thrust forward close behind rolling artillery barrage, without any "effort to maintain a uniform rate of advance or align formations." Instead, as many irregular swarms spaced in breadth and echeloned in depth, they flow into any gaps or weaknesses they can find in order to drive deep into adversary rear.
- Kampfgruppen (small battlegroups consisting of infantry, machinegunners, mortar teams, artillery observers and field engineers) follow-up to cave-in exposed flanks and mop-up isolated centers of resistance from flank and rear.
- Reserves and stronger follow-on echelons move through newly created breaches to maintain momentum and exploit success, as well as attack flanks and rear to widen penetration and consolidate gains against counterattack.

Idea

- Hurl strength (echeloned in great depth) thru weaknesses along (many) paths of least resistance to gain the opportunity for breakthrough and envelopment.

WORLD WAR I

Infiltration Tactics

Note

- Such classic descriptions, often repeated, create in listeners or readers minds vivid images of the infiltration technique.

Critique

- Unfortunately this depiction does not address how and why infiltration fire and movement schemes work.

WORLD WAR I

Infiltration Tactics

Key Points

- Fire at all levels by artillery, mortars, and machineguns is exploited to hold adversary attention and pin him down hence --
- Fire together with gas and smoke (as well as fog and mist) represents an immediate and ominous threat to capture adversary attention, force heads down and dramatically obscure view, thereby cloak infiltrators movements.
- Irregular character of moving swarms (as opposed to well defined line abreast formations) permit infiltrators to blend against irregular and changing terrain features as they push forward.
- Taken together, the captured attention, obscured view, and indistinct, irregular swarms deny adversary the opportunity to picture what is taking place.

Result

- Infiltration teams appear to suddenly loom-up out of nowhere to blow thru, around, and behind disoriented defenders.

WORLD WAR I

Infiltration Tactics

Essence

- Cloud/distort signature and improve mobility to avoid fire yet focus effort to penetrate, shatter, and envelop disconnected debris of adversary system.

Intent

- Gain Tactical success and expand it into a Grand Tactical success.

NOW LOOKING BACK WE HAVE:

Natural Question?

- Are Infiltration Tactics a rejection of the Napoleonic methods--or are they application of these methods under a different guise?

NOW LOOKING BACK WE HAVE:

Natural Question?

Are Infiltration Tactics a rejection of the Napoleonic methods--or are they application of these methods under a different guise?

Response

Infiltration fire and movement schemes can be viewed as Napoleon's strategic maneuvers being transformed into tactical maneuvers down to the lowest operational/organizational level--the squad.

WORLD WAR I

Infiltration Tactics

- Result
 - Immediate success at platoon/company/battalion level coupled with ultimate failure at corps/army level.
- Why?
 - Ludendorff violated his own concept by his tendency to use strategic reserves to reinforce against hardened resistance -- hence, at the strategic level, he seduced himself into supporting failure not success.
 - Exhaustion of combat teams leading the assault.
 - Logistics too inflexible to support rapid/fluid penetration and deeper exploitation of breakthrough.
 - Communications too immobile to allow command to quickly identify and reinforce successful advances.
 - Elastic Defense, when used, (as developed by the Germans and practiced by Petain) that emphasizes artillery and flank attacks against penetrations when they stretch beyond their own artillery support.

WORLD WAR I

Guerrilla Warfare (a la T. E. Lawrence)

Action

- Gain support of population. Must "arrange the minds" of friend, foe and neutral alike. Must "get inside their minds".
- Must "be an idea or thing invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas" (inconspicuousness and fluidity-of-action). Must be an "attack-in-depth".
- Tactics "should be tip-and-run, not pushes but strokes" with "use of the smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place".
- Should be a war of detachment (avoiding contact and presenting a threat everywhere) using mobility/fluidity-of-action and environmental background (vast unknown desert) as basis for "never affording a target" and "never on the defensive except by accident and in error".

Idea

- Disintegrate existing regime's ability to govern.

IMPRESSION

- Infiltration tactics a la Ludendorff seem to be similar in nature to Irregular or Guerrilla tactics a la Lawrence.
- Why? Both stress clouded/distorted signatures, mobility and cohesion of small units to concentrate strength against weakness -- but at different levels of concentration.

MAJOR ADVANCES
BETWEEN WORLD WAR I AND II

LIGHTNING WAR (BLITZKRIEG)

- Infiltration Tactics of 1918 were mated with:
 - Tank
 - Motorized Artillery
 - Tactical Aircraft
 - Motor Transport
 - Better Communications } by {
 - JFC Fuller
 - Heinz Guderian
- Result:
 - Blitzkrieg to generate a breakthrough by piercing a region with multiple narrow thrusts using armor, motorized infantry, and follow-up infantry divisions supported by tactical aircraft.

GUERRILLA WAR

- Guerrilla Strategy and Tactics were codified by Mao Tse-Tung.
- Result:
 - Modern Guerrilla Warfare has become an overall political, economic, psychological and military framework for "total war".

BLITZKRIEG AND GUERRILLA STRATEGY

Infiltration

- Blitz and guerrillas infiltrate a nation or regime at all levels to soften and shatter the moral fiber of the political, economic and social structure. To carry out this program, a la Sun Tzu, Blitz and Guerrillas:
 - Probe and test adversary to unmask strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers, and intentions.
 - Exploit critical differences of opinion, internal contradictions, frictions, obsessions, etc., in order to foment mistrust, sow discord and shape adversary's perception of the world thereby:
 - Create atmosphere of "mental confusion, contradiction of feeling, indecisiveness, panic,"...
 - Manipulate or undermine adversary's plans and actions.

Purpose

- Force capitulation when combined with external political, economic, and military pressures
- or
- Weaken foe to minimize his resistance against military blows that will follow.

WORLD WAR II

Blitzkrieg

Action

- Intelligence (signal, photo, agent...), reconnaissance (air and ground), and patrol actions probe and test adversary before and during combat operations to uncover an overall picture of strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions.
- Mission (goals) assigned. Schwerpunkt (focus of main effort) established before and shifted during combat operations to bypass adversary strength and strike at weakness. Nebenpunkte (other related or supporting effort) employed to tie-up, focus, or drain-away adversary attention and strength (elsewhere).
- Indirect and direct air firepower efforts together with (any needed) sudden/brief preliminary artillery fires are concentrated in sharply defined areas of main effort to impede (or channel) adversary movement, disrupt communications, suppress forward defensive fires, obscure the advance, and divert attention.
- Armored reconnaissance or stormtrooper teams, leading armored columns, advance rapidly from least expected regions and infiltrate adversary front to find paths of least resistance.
- Armored assault teams of tanks, infantry, anti-tank guns, and combat engineers as well as other specialists, together with close artillery and air support, quickly open breaches (via frontal/flank fire and movement combinations) into adversary rear along paths of least resistance uncovered by armored reconnaissance or stormtroopers.
- When breakthrough occurs, relatively independent mobile/armored teams led by armored recce with air support (recce, fire, and airlift when necessary), blow-through to penetrate at high speed deep into adversary interior. Object is to cut lines of communication, disrupt movement, paralyze command and envelop adversary forces and resources.
- Motorized or foot infantry further back supported by artillery and armor pour-in to collapse isolated pockets of resistance, widen the breaches and secure the encirclement or captured terrain against possible counter-attack.

Idea

- Conquer an entire region in the quickest possible time by gaining initial surprise and exploiting the fast tempo/fluidity-of-action of armored teams, with air support, as basis to penetrate, disrupt, envelop, and dismember adversary organism in order to confuse, disorder, and finally shatter his will or capacity to resist.

? RAISES NAGGING QUESTION ?

How do Blitzers simultaneously sustain rapid pace and abruptly adapt to changing circumstances without losing cohesion or coherency of overall effort?

BLITZ OPERATING PHILOSOPHY

KEY POINT

- Each level from simple to complex (platoon to theater) has their own Observation-Orient-Decision-Action time cycle that increases as we try to control more levels and details of command at the higher levels. Put simply, as the number of states we must consider increase, the longer it takes to Observe-Orient-Decide-Act.

IDEA

- This brings out the idea that faster tempo, or rhythm, at lower levels should work within the slower rhythm but larger pattern at higher levels so that overall system does not lose its cohesion or coherency.

RAISES QUESTION

- How do Blitzers harmonize these differing tempos/rhythms so that they can exploit the faster rhythm/smaller pattern (of the lower level units) yet maintain the coherency of the rhythm/pattern for the larger effort?

RESPONSE

- Give lower-level commanders wide freedom, within an overall Mind-Time-Space scheme, to shape/direct their own activities so that they can exploit faster tempo/rhythm at tactical levels yet be in harmony with the larger pattern/slower rhythm associated with the more general aim and larger effort at the strategic level.

UNIFYING AGENT

- Shape overall scheme by applying Schwerpunkt concept, in its broadest sense through all levels, as the unifying notion to link differing rhythms/patterns so that each part or level of the organic whole can operate at its own natural rhythm -- without pulling organism apart -- instead of the slower pace associated with a rigid centralized control.


UNIFYING CONCEPT OF BLITZKRIEG

Schwerpunkt (Focus of Main Effort)


- Implies an unequal distribution of effort as basis to generate superiority in some sectors by thinning-out others.
- Frame-of-reference that is used to shape commitment and convey intent at all levels from theater to platoon.
- Center or axis around which:
 - Maneuver (fire and movement) of all arms and supporting elements are focused to exploit opportunities and maintain tempo of operations.
 - Initiative at tactical level is meshed within intent at strategic level.
- Unifying concept that provides a way to shape focus and direction of effort as well as harmonize support activities with combat operations, thereby permit a true decentralization of tactical command within centralized strategic guidance--without losing cohesion of overall effort.

IMPRESSION OF THE BLITZKRIEG PENETRATION


Thrust and Roll-out/Roll-up Tactics




Impression of the Lincer (Envelopment)




Impression of the Envelopment



Typical Impression of Blitzkrieg Envelopment



Creation of the Blitzkrieg



NOW LOOKING BACK --

Natural Question?

- Why employ multiple thrusts, bundles of multiple thrusts, or bundles of thrusts inside bundles of thrusts?

NOW LOOKING BACK --

Natural Question?

- Why employ multiple thrusts, bundles of multiple thrusts, or bundles of thrusts inside bundles of thrusts?

Response

- Present many (fast breaking) simultaneous and sequential happenings to generate confusion and disorder -- thereby stretch-out time for adversary to respond in a directed fashion.
- Multiply opportunities to uncover, create, and exploit gaps, exposed flanks, and vulnerable rears.
- Create and multiply opportunities to splinter and envelop disconnected remnants thereby dismember adversary thru the Tactical, Grand Tactical, and Strategic levels.

WHICH LEAD TO --

Essence of Blitzkrieg

Employ a Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt maneuver philosophy to generate ambiguity, realize deception, and exploit superior mobility as basis to quickly:

- Create, as well as drive thru, weaknesses in the form of gaps and exposed flanks that open into adversary's vulnerable rear and interior hence --
- Create and exploit opportunities to disrupt his communication, command, and support activities, thereby confuse, disorder and shake his will or capacity to decisively commit his back-up echelons, operational reserves, and/or strategic reserves as well as --
- Create and exploit opportunities to (repeatedly) splinter, envelop and dismember adversary organism thru all levels (Tactical, Grand Tactical, and Strategic) thereby magnify his confusion and disorder and convince him to give up.

Intent

Create Grand Tactical success then exploit and expand it into Strategic success for a decisive victory.

WORLD WAR II

Blitzkrieg

Key to Success

- Use of Schwerpunkt concept to shape, focus, shift, and harmonize operations and support at all levels.
- Intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and stratagem emphasized before and during combat operations to unmask and shape patterns of adversary strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions.
- Broad use of Schwerpunkt concept coupled with fast tempo/fluidity-of-action of armored teams and air support permit Blitzers to repeatedly reshape strength and rapidly shift it against, or thru, weaknesses thereby generate doubt and uncertainty which magnify into panic and chaos.
- Flexible command -- based on Schwerpunkt -- with wide freedom for lower level combat leaders (forward) to exploit opportunities generated by rapid action within a broad loosely woven scheme laid down from central command.
- Superior mobile communications to maintain cohesion of overall effort and to enable higher command levels to allocate reserves and support and to reshape as well as shift focus of main effort.
- Essential and only essential logistics tail (using airlift when appropriate and necessary) to support high speed movement and rapid shift among routes of advance.

BLITZ RESULTS

Successful

- Poland 1939
- France 1940
- Balkans 1941
- Russia 1941
- North Africa 1941-42
- Russia Summer 1942
- Russia Feb-March 1943
- Advance Thru France 1944
- Manchuria 1945
- Middle East 1967
- Czechoslovakia 1968
- Middle East 1973

Unsuccessful

- Russia Winter 1941-42
- Russia Fall, Winter 1942-43
- North Africa 1942
- Russia Summer 1943
- Ardennes Winter 1944-45

MODERN GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN

Action

- Capitalize on discontent and mistrust generated by corruption (real or imagined), incompetence, and unwanted presence of existing regime as basis to organize and maintain mass popular support through a militant political program.
- Set-up administrative and military organization, sanctuary and communications network under the control of the guerrilla political leadership without arousing regime's intelligence and security apparatus.
- Probe and test, by infiltration of regime's political/military organization, to uncover strengths, weaknesses, moves and intentions.
- Shape propaganda, foment civil disorders (such as rallies, demonstrations, strikes, and riots), use selected terrorism, perform sabotage, and exploit resulting misinformation to expand mistrust and sow discord thereby magnify the appearance of corruption, incompetence, and the inability of regime to govern.
- Employ tiny cohesive bands for surprise hit-and-run raids against lines of communications to gain arms and supplies as well as disrupt government communication, coordination, and movement. Retreat and melt into environment when faced by superior police and armed forces.
- Play upon the grievances and obsessions of population (via propaganda, re-education, and selected successes) as well as encourage government to indiscriminately take harsh reprisal measures against them in order to connect the government with expanding climate of mistrust, discord, and moral disintegration. Simultaneously, show (by contrast) that guerrillas exhibit moral authority, offer competence, and provide desired benefits in order to further erode government influence, gain more recruits, multiply base areas, and increase political infrastructure hence expand guerrilla influence/control over population and countryside.
- Harass ever larger government concentrations (in front, flank, and rear) with ever larger bands by sudden ambush against supply columns and patrols and by infiltration or sneak attack against isolated detachments. Disperse to avoid open combat or a major assault by superior forces.
- Demonstrate disintegration of regime by carefully selected attack against major force units using methods of conventional warfare.

Idea

- Defeat existing regime by politically showing they have neither the moral right nor demonstrated ability to govern and militarily by continuously using stealth/fast tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of small bands and larger units in cooperation with political "agitprop" (agitation/propaganda) teams as basis to harass, confuse and ultimately destroy his will or capacity to resist.

MODERN GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN

Essence

- Capitalize on corruption, injustice, incompetence, etc., (or their appearances) as basis to generate atmosphere of mistrust and discord in order to sever moral bonds that bind people to existing regime.

Simultaneously,

- Share existing burdens with people and work with them to root out and punish corruption, remove injustice, eliminate grievances, etc., as basis to form moral bonds between people and guerrillas in order to bind people to guerrilla philosophy and ideals.

Intent

- Shape and exploit environment that permits guerrillas to pump-up their resolve, attract the uncommitted, and drain-away adversary resolve as foundation to replace existing regime with guerrilla regime.

MODERN GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN

KEY TO SUCCESS

- Ability to continuously demonstrate government weakness, erode government influence, and alienate government from population.
- Environmental background and use of stealth/fast tempo/fluidity-of-action coupled with cohesion of tiny bands as basis for repeated concentration against weakness, dispersion to avoid adversary strength and shifting of effort to keep initiative.
- Support of population (both psychological and physical) that willingly furnishes recruits, intelligence, transportation, shelter, refuge, food, money and medical aid.
- Sanctuary (or base) as safe area to which guerrillas "can retire voluntarily or involuntarily, for rest, recuperation, repair of arms, clothing, and equipment, and where recruits can be indoctrinated, trained and equipped."

GUERRILLA RESULTS

Successful

- American Colonies 1775-81
- Spain 1808-14
- Russia 1812
- German East Africa 1914-18
- Arabia 1916-18
- China 1927-49
- Russia 1941-45
- Yugoslavia 1941-45
- Indochina 1945-54
- Algeria 1954-62
- Cuba 1956-59
- South Vietnam 1958-75

Unsuccessful

- Philippines 1899-1902
- South Africa 1900-02
- Greece 1944-49
- Philippines* 1946-54
- Malaya* 1948-60

* Regime exercised particular care not to inflict casualties and to protect population.

BLITZ/GUERRILLA THEME

Essence

- Exploit ambiguity, deception and superior mobility to generate initial surprise and shock followed by surprise and shock again, again, again, ...
- Avoid battles -- instead disrupt connections, centers, and activities that provide cohesion (e.g., psychological/moral bonds, communications, lines of communication, command and supply centers, ...).
- Roll-up the isolated units/remnants created by the surprise, shock and disruption.

Intent

- Exploit surprise, shock, and disruption to generate confusion, disorder, and panic thereby shatter cohesion, paralyze effort, and bring about adversary collapse.

DISRUPT THE CONNECTIONS AND CENTERS THAT PROVIDE COHESION

Israeli example (a la Gen. Y. Yadin - 1949)

"To exploit the principles of war for our purpose and base ourselves upon strategic indirect approach, so as to determine the issue of the fighting even before fighting has begun, it is necessary to achieve the three following aims:

- (a) to cut the enemy's lines of communications, thus paralysing his physical build-up;
- (b) to seal him off from his lines of retreat thus undermining the enemy's will and destroying his morale;
- (c) to hit his centers of administration and disrupt his communications thus severing the link between his brain and limbs."

? KEY QUESTION ?

- Why have Blitz and Guerrilla tactics been so extraordinarily successful?

MESSAGE

Action

- Blitz and Guerrillas repeatedly and unexpectedly create weaknesses then hurl strength against, or thru, those weaknesses by being able to:
 - Operate in a more indistinct, more irregular, and quicker manner (than their adversaries) thereby they can --
 - Repeatedly concentrate or disperse more inconspicuously and/or more quickly from or to lower levels of distinction (organizational, operational, and environmental) without losing cohesion of overall effort.

or put another way

- Blitz and Guerrillas, by being more indistinct, more irregular, and quicker, operate inside adversary Observation-Oriented-Decision-Action loops or get inside his Mind-Time-Space.


Result

- Such activity by Blitz and Guerrillas make them appear ambiguous (unpredictable) and awesome which magnifies into confusion, disorder, and panic (among their adversaries) to shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about collapse -- a notion implied by Sun Tzu around 400 BC and more recently recognized by J.F.C. Fuller after observing the impact of Ludendorff's infiltration tactics in 1918.

? NATURAL QUESTIONS ?

- How can we defend against or counter the Blitz?
- How can we defend against or counter the Guerrilla Movement?

"Where are the Weaknesses
of the Blitz?"



KEY POINT

Difficult to sustain fast tempo and maintain cohesion of Blitz effort when forced to repeatedly and rapidly shift concentration of strength against weakness.

COUNTER-BLITZ

(Variation of German Experiences During WWII)

Posture

- Emphasize intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and set-up screen of forward outposts and patrols to report on adversary activity and warn of any impending or actual incursions.
- Deploy and disperse reconnaissance and mobile anti-tank/infantry/armored teams together with artillery in region behind screen so that they can inconspicuously/quickly move laterally and forward to focus and shift local main efforts against adversary thrust(s).
- Place armored teams, as mobile reserve, in echelon behind recce, anti-tank/infantry/armor and artillery so that they can easily focus effort, and quickly move-in to decapitate any local breakthrough -- or push-off for a Blitz counterstroke.

Action

- Employ air and fast moving mobile/armored reconnaissance teams to determine direction/strength of thrust(s) and to continuously harass by repeated delaying actions and hit-and-run attacks in order to slow momentum and erode cohesion of Blitz attack.
- Inconspicuously move-in with high speed mobile anti-tank/infantry/armored teams, together with air and artillery support, to strengthen favorable sectors and combine the ambush with repeated sudden/sharp flank and rear counter-attacks to channel as well as drain-away momentum and break-up cohesion of Blitz thrust(s).
- Concentrate swift armored combat forces (held in reserve) and use with air to rapidly drive a shallow and/or deep flank counterstroke in order to swing in behind and roll-up Blitz offensive in detail (counterstroke launched while adversary is moving forward).

Idea

- Smash Blitz offensive by inconspicuously using fast tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of counter-Blitz combat teams as basis for shifting of forces and quick focus of air and ground effort to throttle momentum, shatter cohesion, and envelop Blitz in order to destroy adversary's capacity to resist.

NOTE

Counter-Blitz imposes a greater stress than Blitz upon the cohesion of friendly combat teams -- since Counter-Blitzers must be able to react more inconspicuously and quicker than Blitz counterparts.

BLITZ AND COUNTER-BLITZ

Main Features and Emphasis

- Intelligence and Recce Action
- Infiltration
- Ambiguity, Deception, and Speed to generate Surprise and Shock
- Schwerpunkt philosophy
- Acceptance of "gaps" and (related) "risks" in support of Schwerpunkt philosophy
- Echelon-In-Depth (offense and defense)
- Reserves reconstituted and accumulated (at all levels) to support or generate success
- Posture of positions, alternative positions, dummy positions and roving positions to mask maneuvers and intentions

WHERE IS THE WEAKNESS OF GUERRILLA EFFORT?

Guerrillas need cause and support of population that is dependent upon regime's corruption and incompetence.

COUNTER-GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN
(a la Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Ramon Magsaysay)

Action

- Undermine guerrilla cause and destroy their cohesion by demonstrating integrity and competence of government to represent and serve needs of people -- rather than exploit and impoverish them for the benefit of a greedy elite.*
- Take political initiative to root out and visibly punish corruption. Select new leaders with recognized competence as well as popular appeal. Ensure that they deliver justice, eliminate grievances and connect government with grass roots.*
- Infiltrate guerrilla movement as well as employ population for intelligence about guerrilla plans, operations and organization.
- Deploy administrative talent, police, and roving counter-guerrilla teams into affected regions to inhibit guerrilla communication, coordination and movement, minimize guerrilla contact with local inhabitants, isolate their ruling cadres, and destroy their infrastructure.
- Take and keep initiative by relentless pursuit. Employ (guerrillas' own) tactics of reconnaissance, infiltration, surprise hit-and-run, and sudden ambush to keep roving bands off-balance and to make base areas untenable.
- Emphasize capture and conversion to government cause -- instead of harsh anti-population reprisal measures and "body count" -- as basis to undermine guerrilla influence.
- Visibly identify central government with local political/economic/social reform in order to connect government with hopes and needs of people, thereby gain their support and confirm government legitimacy.

Idea

- Destroy guerrilla cohesion and break their hold upon the population via political initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize stealth/fast tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of overall effort.

* If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides!

CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT

CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT

- Now looking back and reflecting upon the panorama of military history we can imagine three kinds of human conflict:
 - Attrition Warfare -- as practiced by the Emperor Napoleon, by all sides during the 19th century and during World War I, by the Allies during World War II, and by present-day nuclear planners.
 - Maneuver Conflict -- as practiced by the Mongols, General Bonaparte, Confederate General Stonewall Jackson, Hitler's Generals (in particular Manstein, Guderian, Balck, Rommel) and the Americans under Generals Patton and MacArthur.
 - Moral Conflict -- as practiced by the Mongols, most Guerrilla Leaders, a very few Counter-Guerrillas (such as Magsaysay) and certain others from Sun Tzu to the present.
- With these comments in mind let's look into the essentials of each.

ATTRITION OBSERVATIONS

- Firepower, as a destructive force, is king.
- Protection (trenches, armor, dispersion, etc.) is used to weaken or dilute effects of enemy firepower.
- Mobility is used to bring firepower to bear or to evade enemy fire.
- Measures of success are (now) "bodycount" and targets destroyed.
- Seize and hold terrain objectives replaces Napoleon's dictum: Destroy enemy army.

ESSENCE OF ATTRITION WARFARE

Create and Exploit

- Destructive Force:

Weapons (mechanical, chemical, biological, nuclear, etc.) that kill, maim, and/or otherwise generate widespread destruction.

- Protection:

Ability to minimize the concentrated and explosive expression of destructive force by taking cover behind natural or manmade obstacles, by dispersion of people and resources, and by being obscure using camouflage, smoke, etc., together with cover and dispersion.

- Mobility:

Speed or rapidity to focus destructive force or move away from adversary's destructive focus.

Payoff

- Frightful and debilitating attrition via widespread destruction as basis to:
 - Break enemy's will to resist
 - Seize and hold terrain objectives

AIM

Compel enemy to surrender and sue for peace.

OBSERVATIONS REGARDING MANEUVER

- Ambiguity, ambivalence, deception, and mobility are used to generate surprise and shock.
- Fire and movement are used in combination, like Cheng/Ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt, to tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention and strength in order to expose as well as menace and exploit vulnerabilities or weaknesses elsewhere.
- Indications of success tend to be qualitative and are related to the widespread onset of confusion and disorder, frequent envelopments, high prisoner counts or any other phenomena that suggests inability to adapt to change.

ESSENCE OF MANEUVER CONFLICT

Create, Exploit, and Magnify

- Ambiguity
Alternative or competing impressions of events as they may or may not be
- Ambivalence
Alternating impressions/feelings that oppose or contradict one another
- Deception
An impression of events as they are not
- Fast Transient Maneuvers
Irregular and rapid shift from one maneuver event/state to another
- Effort (Cheng/Ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt)
An exertion of strength or an expenditure of energy--focused against, or thru, features that permit an organic whole to exist

Payoff

- Disorientation
Mismatch between events one (seemingly) observes or anticipates and events (or efforts) he must react or adapt to
- Surprise
Disorientation generated by perceiving extreme change (of events or efforts) over a short period of time
- Shock
Paralyzing state of disorientation generated by extreme or violent change (of events or efforts) over a short period of time
- Disruption
State of being split-apart, broken-up, or torn asunder

AIM

Generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity and magnify adversary's friction (in a mental as well as a physical sense) as basis to shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about his collapse

NOTE

Surprise and Shock can also be represented as an overload beyond one's immediate ability to respond or adapt. In this context, we may view the "ESSENCE OF MANEUVER CONFLICT" a bit differently --

ESSENCE OF MANEUVER CONFLICT

Create, Exploit, and Magnify

- Ambiguity

Alternative or competing impressions of events as they may or may not be

- Ambivalence

Alternating impressions/feelings that oppose or contradict one another

- Deception

An impression of events as they are not

- Fast Transient Maneuvers

Irregular and rapid shift from one maneuver event/state to another

- Effort (Cheng/Ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt)

An exertion of strength or an expenditure of energy--focused against, or thru, features that permit an organic whole to exist

Payoff

- Disorientation

Mismatch between events one observes or imagines and events (or efforts) he must react or adapt to

- Disruption

State of being split-apart, broken-up, or torn asunder

- Overload

A welter of threatening events/efforts beyond one's mental or physical capacity to adapt or endure

AIM

- Generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity and magnify adversary's friction (in a mental as well as a physical sense) as basis to shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about his collapse

or equivalently

- Uncover, create, and exploit many vulnerabilities and weaknesses to pull adversary apart and bring about his collapse

OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO MORAL CONFLICT

Gen Hermann Balck

Theme

- No fixed recipes for organization, communications, tactics, leadership, etc.
- Wide freedom for subordinates to exercise initiative and imagination--yet harmonize within intent of superior commanders.
- Heavy reliance upon moral (human values) instead of material superiority as basis for cohesion and ultimate success.
- Commanders must create a bond and breadth of experience based upon trust -- not mistrust -- for cohesion.

How is this Atmosphere Achieved?

- By example leaders (at all levels) must demonstrate requisite physical energy, mental agility, and moral authority to inspire subordinates to enthusiastically cooperate and take initiatives within superiors intent.

What is the Price?

- Courage to share danger and discomfort at the front.
- Willingness to support and promote (unconventional or difficult) subordinates that accept danger, demonstrate initiative, take risks, and come-up with new ways toward mission accomplishment.
- Dedication and resolve to face-up to and master uncomfortable circumstances that fly in the face of the traditional solution.

Benefit

- Internal simplicity that permits rapid adaptability.

OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO MORAL CONFLICT

Cyril Falls -- "The Art of War from the Age of Napoleon to the Present Day" -- 1961

Page 124

"In the First World War 'cellar life' had been a feature of the adversities of Paris, which actually came under the fire of specially built long-range guns in 1918, as well as aircraft bombing. In the East End of London air raids caused a tendency to panic in the latter part of 1917, and, whether there was a raid or not, some 300,000 people crowded each night into the underground railway stations and slept on the platforms....There was little organized civil defence beyond the reduction of lights."

Page 161

"The Germans, who were far ahead of any rival in the science of lighter-than-air construction, refused to accept the general belief that the future lay entirely with the heavier-than-air. Their Zeppelins... were employed chiefly in night attacks on England. On one occasion a single airship did a million pounds worth of damage in a raid, but on the whole their success was mainly moral and measured in terms of absenteeism in factories and sensational drops in the production of warlike material."

Page 165

"Early in the war the German Armies owed much in their victories in Poland, Belgium, and France to their dive-bombers. These aircraft acted in close support to the armour and infantry....They often put hostile artillery out of action, but generally by driving the detachments from their guns. The successes were won for the most part by moral rather than material effect. To troops unused to them, especially the French divisions of low categories, they proved extremely unsettling."

OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO MORAL CONFLICT

Insights Regarding Falls' Statements and Balck's Ideas

- From Falls' comments we note (with slight alteration) the following words and phrases: panic... moral... absenteeism... sensational drops in production... divebombers successes were for the most part moral... to troops unused to them... they proved extremely unsettling. A quick glance shows that all these words and phrases are directly related to one another.
- Going even further we can say: Falls' comments on pages 124, 161, and 165 suggest that moral effects are related to the menace posed by the zeppelins and divebombers, and the uncertainty associated with not knowing what to expect or how to deal with this menace. Put simply: Moral effects are related to menace and uncertainty.
- For a first cut this suggests that moral strength represents mental capacity to overcome menace and uncertainty.
- On the other hand, this first cut seems to leave out something that humans either need or must overcome for collective moral strength. Fortunately we have some clues:
 - First: Remember that Guerrilla Commanders (see Modern Guerrilla Campaign) stress use of propaganda, civil disorders, selected terrorism, etc., as basis to generate mistrust and discord.
 - Second: Balck emphasizes the importance of trust -- not mistrust -- for cohesion.
- Now, recognizing that both Balck and Guerrilla Commanders work in a hostile environment (of menace and uncertainty) that naturally breeds mistrust, it is clear that moral effects must include this factor.
- This suggests moral strength represents mental capacity to overcome menace, uncertainty and mistrust.

OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO MORAL CONFLICT

- Now by using moral strength as a point of departure--and by feeding in those unsettling or threatening experiences (a la Clausewitz) that either bring out fear, anxiety, and alienation, or their more noble counterweights, courage, confidence, and esprit--we can evolve the following related notions:
 - Moral Strength: Mental capacity to overcome menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.
 - Moral Victory: Triumph of courage, confidence, and esprit (de corps) over fear, anxiety, and alienation when confronted by menace, uncertainty and mistrust.
 - Moral Defeat: Triumph of fear, anxiety, and alienation over courage, confidence, and esprit when confronted by menace, uncertainty and mistrust.
 - Moral Values: Human values that permit one to carry on in the face of menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.
 - Moral Authority: Person or body that can give one the courage, confidence, and esprit to overcome menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.
- Finally, by stripping away and recombining essentials--from these notions as well as from the ideas and experiences of Clausewitz, Balck, and Falls--we can evolve the Essence of Moral Conflict.

ESSENCE OF MORAL CONFLICT

Create, Exploit, and Magnify

- Menace:

Impressions of danger to one's well being and survival.

- Uncertainty:

Impressions, or atmosphere, generated by events that appear ambiguous, contradictory, erratic, unfamiliar, chaotic, etc.

- Mistrust:

Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion that loosens human bonds among members of an organic whole or between organic wholes.

Idea

- Surface fear, anxiety, and alienation in order to generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity thereby magnify internal friction.

AIM

Destroy moral bonds that permit an organic whole to exist.

THEME FOR ANNIHILATION

Synthesize

- Destructive Effort:

Tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention and strength as well as (or thereby) overload critical vulnerabilities and generate weaknesses.

- Maneuver:

Disorient, disrupt, and/or overload vulnerable yet critical connections, centers, and activities as basis to splinter adversary organism and bring about collapse.

- Moral:

Create atmosphere of fear, anxiety, and alienation to sever human bonds that permit an organic whole to exist.

Idea

- Destroy adversary's moral-mental-physical cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about his collapse.

AIM

Annihilate adversary's capacity to function as an organic whole.

SYNTHESIS

PATTERN FOR SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS

- Goal
- Plan
- Action
- Support
- Command

PATTERN FOR SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS

Goal

- Deprive adversary of his capacity to cope with events/efforts as they unfold.

Plan

- Probe and test adversary to unmask strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers, and intentions.
- Employ a variety of measures that interweave menace-uncertainty-mistrust with tangles of ambiguity-ambivalence-deception as basis to sever adversary's moral ties and disorient or twist his mental images, hence mask-distort-magnify our presence and activities.
- Select initiative (or response) that is least expected.
- Establish focus of main effort together with other (related) effort and pursue direction that permits many branches and threatens alternative objectives.
- Move along paths of least resistance (to reinforce and exploit success).
- Exploit, rather than disrupt or destroy, those differences, frictions, obsessions, etc., of adversary organism that interfere with his ability to cope with unfolding circumstances.
- Disorient, disrupt, or overload adversary's vulnerable, yet critical, connections, centers, and activities that provide cohesion and permit coherent observation - orientation - decision - action in order to dismember organism and isolate remnants for mop-up or absorption.

Action

- Observe, orient, decide, and act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity (or fluidity) as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as to repeatedly and unexpectedly focus main effort thru vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s) that tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere.

Support

- Superior mobile communications
 - Only essential logistics
- } to maintain cohesion of overall effort and sustain appropriate pace of operations within available resources

Command

- Decentralize, in a tactical sense, to encourage lower level commanders to shape, direct, and take the sudden/sharp actions necessary to quickly exploit opportunities as they present themselves.
- Centralize, in a strategic sense, to establish aims, match ambitions with means/talent, sketch flexible plans, allocate resources, and shape focus of overall effort.

IMPRESSIONS

- Plan and Action statements suggest that we are trying to:
 - Get inside adversary system and mask own system against his penetration
 - Create multiple impressions of what is occurring and what is about to occur
 - Generate mismatches between what seems to be and what is
 - Push adversary beyond his ability to adapt
- Intentions that make-up Plan cannot happen without application of transients that make-up Action.

FIRST IMPRESSION

- Note how these strategic and tactical ideas, that we evolved from the Plan and Action statements, fit-in nicely with the following comments by Napoleon:

- "The art of land warfare is an art of genius, of inspiration. ... A general never knows anything with certainty, never sees his enemy clearly, never knows positively where he is. When armies are face to face, the least accident in the ground, the smallest wood, may conceal part of the enemy army. The most experienced eye cannot be sure whether it sees the whole of the enemy's army or only three-fourths. It is by the mind's eye, by the integration of all reasoning, by a kind of inspiration, that the general sees, knows, and judges."
- "The first quality for a commander in chief is a cool head which receives a just impression of things; he should not allow himself to be confused by either good or bad news; the impressions which he receives successively or simultaneously in the course of a day should classify themselves in his mind in such a way as to occupy the place which they merit; because reason and judgment are the result of the comparison of various impressions taken into just consideration."

- Above comments, by Napoleon, reveal ever-present vulnerabilities and weaknesses that commanders and subordinates alike must accept.

hence

- If we turn these comments around and connect them with the tactical and strategic ideas presented thus far, we surface a modern notion of Grand Tactics.

WHICH BECOMES:

Grand Tactics

- Operate inside adversary's observation-orientation-decision-action loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create a tangle of threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes, or anticipates, and those he must react to, to survive.

thereby
- Push adversary beyond his moral, mental, or physical capacity to adapt or endure, so that he can neither divine our intentions nor focus his effort(s) to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive maneuver as it drives into him.

SECOND IMPRESSION

Transients

- Observe, Orient, Decide and Act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity...

or put another way

- Operate inside adversary's Observation-orientation-Decision-Action loops or get inside his Mind-Time-Space

Permits one to

Intentions

- Probe and test adversary to unmask strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers, and intentions
- Employ a variety of measures that interweave menace-uncertainty-mistrust with tangles of ambiguity-ambivalence-deception as basis to sever adversary's moral ties and disorient...
- Select initiative (or response) that is least expected
- Establish focus of main effort together with other effort and pursue direction that permits many branches and threatens alternative objectives
- Move along paths of least resistance (to reinforce and exploit success)
- Exploit, rather than disrupt or destroy, those differences, frictions, and obsessions of adversary organism that interfere with his ability to cope...
- Disorient, disrupt, or overload adversary's vulnerable, yet critical, connections, centers, and activities... in order to dismember organism and isolate remnants for mop-up or absorption
- Generate uncertainty, confusion, disorder, panic, chaos,... to shatter cohesion, produce paralysis and bring about collapse
- Become an extraordinary commander

WHICH LEADS TO:

Strategy

- Dissolve adversary's moral fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his (related) operations, and overload his system--in order to generate confusion, disorder, panic, chaos, ... as well as isolate remnants--thereby shatter (moral-mental-physical) cohesion, paralyze effort, and bring about adversary collapse.

NOW ALTOGETHER

Tactics

- Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity, as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as to repeatedly and unexpectedly focus main effort into vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s) that tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere.

Grand Tactics

- Operate inside adversary's observation-orientation-decision-action loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create tangles of threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes, or anticipates, and those he must react to, to survive.

thereby

- Maneuver adversary beyond his moral, mental, or physical capacity to adapt or endure, so that he can neither divine our intentions nor focus his effort(s) to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive stroke as it drives into him.

Strategy

- Dissolve adversary's moral fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his (related) operations, and overload his system in order to shatter cohesion, paralyze effort, and bring about adversary collapse.

Strategic Aim

- Deprive adversary of his capacity to adapt as an organic whole so that he cannot cope with events/efforts as they unfold.

? RAISES QUESTION ?

How do we connect these Tactical and Strategic notions with the National Goal?

--VIA A SENSIBLE GRAND STRATEGY THAT WILL:

- Support national goal.
- Pump-up our resolve, drain-away adversary resolve, and attract the uncommitted.
- End conflict on favorable terms.
- Ensure that conflict and peace terms do not provide seeds for (unfavorable) future conflict.

GRAND STRATEGY

Essence

- Shape pursuit of national goal so that potential adversaries realize some benefits and are empathetic toward our success.

Basis

- An appreciation for our's as well as our potential adversaries' underlying self-interests, critical differences of opinion, internal contradictions, frictions, obsessions, etc.

PATTERN

National Goal

- Improve our fitness, as an organic whole, to shape and cope with an everchanging environment.

Grand Strategy

- Shape pursuit of national goal so that potential adversaries realize some benefits and are empathetic toward our success.

Strategic Aim

- Deprive adversary of his capacity to adapt as an organic whole so that he cannot cope with events/efforts as they unfold.

Strategy

- Dissolve adversary's moral fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his (related) operations, and overload his system in order to shatter cohesion, paralyze effort, and bring about adversary collapse.

Grand Tactics

- Operate inside adversary's observation-orientation-decision-action loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create tangles of threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes, or anticipates, and those he must react to, to survive.

thereby

- Maneuver adversary beyond his moral, mental or physical capacity to adapt or endure, so that he can neither divine our intentions nor focus his effort(s) to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive stroke as it drives into him.

Tactics

- Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity, as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as to repeatedly and unexpectedly focus main effort into vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s) that tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere.

NOTE

On one hand, as shown on the previous chart, the National Goal and Grand Strategy tend to be constructive in nature. On the other hand, the Strategic Aim, Strategy, Grand Tactics, and Tactics are destructive in nature and operate over a shorter time frame. In this sense, the upper two and the latter four notions, as expressed, appear to be in disharmony with one another. Yet, application of these latter four strategic and tactical notions permit real leadership to avoid high attrition, avoid widespread destruction, and gain a quick victory. This, combined with shattered cohesion, paralysis, and rapid collapse demonstrated by the existing adversary regime, makes it appear corrupt, incompetent, and unfit to govern. Under these circumstances, leaders and statesmen offering generous terms can form the basis for a viable peace. In this sense, the first two and the latter four notions can be in harmony with one another.

APPLICATION

COUNTER-BLITZ

a 1a SUN TZU

COUNTER-BLITZ

a 1a SUN TZU

Maneuver Scheme

- Employ Cheng/Nebenpunkte as basis to repeatedly and unexpectedly tie-up, divert, stretch-out, or drain-away adversary attention and strength in order to expose vulnerabilities and weaknesses for decisive stroke(s) by Ch'i/Schwerpunkt.

AIM

- Blind-side adversary regardless of circumstances.

COUNTER-BLITZ

a la SUN TZU

STRATEGY

Shape Adversary Impression

- Arrange elements of defense, (in harmony with penchant for humans to generate mental patterns), as basis to guide adversaries to form or project patterns on the environment they are facing. In other words, emphasize certain features so that adversary intelligence, recce, patrols and other observation activity generate mental pictures of what we seem to be doing. In this sense, we cause adversary to project tempo or rhythm as well as a sense of form or gestalt upon the environment. Naturally, this raises the question: How do we want our posture to appear to an adversary -- or put another way, what kind of mental picture do we want to generate in his mind?

COUNTER-BLITZ

a 1a SUN TZU

STRATEGY

How?

- Set-up positions echeloned-in-depth (similar to German philosophy) with flexibility to quickly rotate or shift both front and flank maneuver schemes -- yet convince adversary, (with help from "shaping" agencies/activities - intelligence, electronic warfare, etc.) for example, that he is facing an in-depth strongpoint/checkerboard or multiple belts of an in-depth linear or elastic defense. In this sense, we suggest three belts or bands behind the front as follows:
 - Emphasize intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and set-up screen of forward outposts and patrols to report on adversary activity and warn of any impending or actual incursions.
 - Deploy and disperse reconnaissance and mobile anti-tank infantry/armored teams together with artillery in region behind screen so that they can inconspicuously/quickly move laterally and forward to focus and shift local main efforts against adversary thrusts.
 - Place armored teams, as mobile reserve, in echelon behind recce, anti-tank infantry/armor and artillery so that they can easily focus effort, and quickly move-in to decapitate any local breakthrough -- or push-off for a Blitz counterstroke.

COUNTER-BLITZ

a 1a SUN TZU

STRATEGY

Game

- Shift from such an ambiguous or misleading posture into a gauntlet defense with alternate channels, sectors, or zones by thinning-out some sectors or zones in order to strengthen others.
- Basic notion is to think in terms of channels, avenues, and gauntlets (instead of just belts, bands and fronts) so that ambush gauntlets will naturally evolve or be set-up to deal with forward as well as lateral (roll-out) thrusts of adversary (see sketch). In this way ambush gauntlets can then be set-up at any level from platoon to theater.

COUNTER-BLITZ

a 1a SUN TZU

TACTICS

Basic Maneuver

- Use obstacles, delaying actions, hit-and-run attacks, and/or baited retreats in thinned-out sectors/zones together with "shaping" and "disruption" activities to disorient adversary as well as pile-up or stretch-out his maneuver. Combine this action with fire and movement into adversary flank and/or rear from strengthened adjacent sectors/zones to:
 - slow momentum and blow adversary away (during pile-up) or
 - channel momentum then decapitate and break-up cohesion of thrust (during stretch-out).

Mental Picture

- Think of obstacles, delay, hit-and-run, and baited retreats together with "shaping" and "disruption" activities as Cheng or Nebenpunkte to create gaps, exposed flanks, and vulnerable rears by the pile-up/congestion or stretch-out of adversary maneuver.
- Think of Ch'i or Schwerpunkt maneuver (fire and movement) hitting unexpectedly thru gaps into adversary flank/rear, or blind-side, as decisive stroke to pull enemy apart and roll-up his isolated remnants.

COUNTER-BLITZ

a 1a SUN TZU

TACTICS

Action

- Employ air and fast moving mobile/armored recce teams, with mobile anti-tank teams, artillery, and "shaping"/"disruption" activities in support, as Nebenpunkte to determine direction/strength of thrusts and (by local front/flank combinations) to continuously harass with repeated delaying actions and hit-and-run attacks. Object is to:
 - disorient adversary;
 - provide information to senior commanders to help them decide which sectors to thin-out and which to strengthen;
 - pile-up or stretch-out adversary maneuver to "shape" (or disrupt) tempo/rhythm and pattern of Blitz attack as well as create exposed flanks and vulnerable rears.
- Inconspicuously move-in with high speed mobile anti-tank infantry/armored teams together with air and artillery support as Schwerpunkt to strengthen appropriate sectors that flank adversary thrusts. From here, we ambush adversary with fire together with repeated sudden/sharp flank and rear counter-thrusts against his forward and roll-out efforts moving through our thinned-out sectors. Object is to work Schwerpunkt in harmony with Nebenpunkte in order to channel as well as throttle momentum and break-up cohesion of Blitz thrusts.

COUNTER-BLITZ

a 1a SUN TZU

GRAND MANEUVER

Mental Picture

- Imagine the fluid Cheng/Ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt counter-operations just discussed to be Super Nebenpunkte operations that are used to tie-up or drain-away adversary strength. Idea is to set-up and launch a Blitz counter-stroke, or Super Schwerpunkt, deep into adversary weakness while he (with his strength) is preoccupied in overcoming the challenge posed by these operations.

Action

- Keep pressure on and continually force adversary to adapt to many abrupt and irregular changes generated by the ongoing Super Nebenpunkte operations.
- When adversary is strung-out, or disconnected, and vulnerable: Unleash swift armored forces (held in reserve) together with air to hook-in behind and help roll-up adversary Blitz as well as push-off for a Blitz Counteroffensive. Shift forces as appropriate from local Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt operations (as well as from other sectors) into this Super Schwerpunkt to both generate and exploit a decisive success.

COUNTER-BLITZ

a 1a SUN TZU

CAUTION

- Extensive use of many lower-level Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt actions across many sectors/zones drains-away resources needed for fewer but decisive large scale Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt operations.
- Furthermore, experience has shown, when under active pressure, it is difficult to disengage forces committed to these local efforts and shift them to the larger operation.
- In this sense, these many shallow lower-level actions or maneuvers across a broad front tend to take-on the character of Battle or Attrition Warfare while deep, large scale (up to theater level) Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt operations take-on the character of Strategic Maneuver.

COUNTER-BLITZ

a 1a SUN TZU

Underlying Idea

- Pull adversary apart and bring about his collapse by causing him to generate or project mental images that agree neither with the faster tempo/rhythm nor with the hidden form of the transient maneuver patterns he must compete against.

BLITZ/COUNTER-BLITZ STRATEGIC DESIGN

OR

MANSTEIN DIVINED

OUTLINE

- BACKGROUND
- STRATEGIC DESIGN

BACKGROUND

- BATTLE OF LEUCTRA AND LEUTHEN
- BATTLE OF CANNAE
- SCHLIEFFEN STRATEGIC MANEUVER


OBSERVATION

LEUCTRA, LEUTHEN, OR SCHLIEFFEN OBLIQUE/ASYMMETRICAL ORDER
TAKE LESS FORCE THAN MARATHON OR CANNAE SYMMETRICAL ORDER
TO ACHIEVE THE SAME BENEFIT.

STRATEGIC DESIGN

- POLAND
- FRANCE
- RUSSIA

POLAND 1939



CONCENTRIC CANNAE WITH LEUCTRA/LEUTHEN UNDERTONE


POLAND 1939

KEY POINT

- GERMANS HAD MORE FORCES THAN POLES.


FRANCE 1940

PHASE I



LEUCTRA/LEUTHEN

PHASE II




ECCENTRIC CANNAE WITH
LEUCTRA/LEUTHEN WINGS

FRANCE 1940

KEY POINTS

- GERMANS HAD LESS FORCES THAN ALLIES BEFORE PHASE I.
- GERMANS HAD MORE FORCES THAN ALLIES BEFORE PHASE II.

RUSSIA 1941



The drive in Russia 1941


ECCENTRIC CANNAE WITH TWO LEUCTRA/LEUTHEN WINGS

RUSSIA 1941

KEY POINT

- GERMANS HAD LESS FORCES THAN RUSSIANS.

CAUCASUS/STALINGRAD 1942



LEUCTRA/LEUTHEN FOLLOWED BY ECCENTRIC...!

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BLITZ/COUNTER-BLITZ STRATEGIC DESIGN

Leuctra/Leuthen/Schlieffen

- Manstein - France (Phase I) 1940.
- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
- Manstein - Kerch Peninsula 1942.
- OKW/OKH - Caucasus/Stalingrad Counterstroke 1942.
- Manstein - Donetsk Counterstroke 1943.
- Manstein Proposal - Counterstroke from Kharkov to Sea of Azov 1943.
- Rundstedt/Rommel Proposal - Normandy 1944.
- Ardennes - 1944-45.

Cannae -- with Leuctra/Leuthen/Schlieffen Undertone

- Poland - 1939
- France (Phase II) - 1940
- Russia - 1941
- Kursk - 1943

?? NATURAL QUESTION ??

HOW COME GERMANS DID NOT ATTEMPT A LEUCTRA/LEUTHEN
STRATEGIC MANEUVER AGAINST RUSSIA IN 1941??

RUNDSTEDT

"The 1941 operations in Russia should, in my opinion have had their main effort directed, not at first towards Moscow, but towards Leningrad. That would have linked up with the Finns. Then, in the next stage, should have come an attack on Moscow from the north, in co-operation with the advance of Field-Marshal von Bock's Army Group from the west."

BLITZ/COUNTER-BLITZ STRATEGIC DESIGN

Leuctra/Leuthen/Schlieffen

- Manstein - France (Phase I) 1940.
- Rundstedt Proposal - Thrust to Leningrad followed by thrust (roll-up) to South and take Moscow - 1941.
- Manstein - Kerch Peninsula 1942.
- OKW/OKH - Caucasus/Stalingrad Counterstroke 1942.
- Manstein - Donetsk Counterstroke 1943.
- Manstein Proposal - Counterstroke from Kharkov to Sea of Azov 1943.
- Rundstedt/Rommel Proposal - Normandy 1944.
- Ardennes - 1944-45.

Cannae -- with Leuctra/Leuthen/Schlieffen Undertone

- Poland - 1939
- France (Phase II) - 1940
- Russia - 1941
- Kursk - 1943

MESSAGE

ONLY MANSTEIN (AND A FEW OTHERS) KNEW HOW TO SYNTHESIZE AND
APPLY THE TEACHINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ AND JOMINI IN A STRATEGIC
AS WELL AS A GRAND TACTICS AND TACTICS SENSE.

WRAP-UP

WRAP-UP

Message

- He who is unwilling (or unable) to adapt to or create the more indistinct, more irregular, and quicker changes of rhythm and pattern (to focus effort) -- goes under or survives to be dominated.

or contrarywise

- He who is willing (and able) to create and adapt to the more indistinct, more irregular, and quicker changes of rhythm and pattern (to focus effort) -- survives and dominates.

WRAP-UP

GAME

- Create tangles of threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts an adversary observes or imagines (Cheng/Nebenpunkte) and those he must react to (Ch'i/Schwerpunkt) in order to:
 - Sever adversary's moral ties, disorient his mind, disrupt his operations, and overload his system
- thereby
- Pull adversary apart and deny him the opportunity to function as an adaptable organism.

HOW

- Get inside adversary observation-orientation-decision-action loops (at all levels) by being more subtle, more indistinct, more irregular, and quicker--yet appear to be otherwise.

WRAP-UP

IMPLICATIONS

- In a tactical sense, a fast transient move/countermove operation is primarily a spontaneous synthetic/creative (right hemisphere) observation-orientation-decision-action maneuver/countermove, rather than a step-by-step analytical/logical (left hemisphere) observation-orientation-decision-action game/countergame.
 - In accepting this idea we must admit that unit complexity (with increased task loadings) does not enhance the spontaneous synthetic/creative operation. Rather, it constrains the opportunity for these timely actions/counteractions.

or put another way
 - Complexity (technical, organizational, operational, etc.) causes commanders and subordinates alike to be captured by their own internal dynamics or interactions -- hence they cannot adapt to rapidly changing external (or internal) circumstances.
- In a strategic sense, the concept of maneuver/countermove suggests we need a potential for a variety of possibilities. Why?
 - Ability to simultaneously and sequentially generate many different possibilities as well as rapidly shift among them permits one to repeatedly generate mismatches between events/efforts adversary observes or imagines and those he must respond to (to survive).
 - Without a variety of possibilities adversary is given the opportunity to read as well as adapt to events and efforts as they unfold.

EPILOGUE

COMMENT

- Reflection upon the previous discussion and reflection upon the various Principles of War that are bandied about leave one unsettled about the real value associated with these principles.
- To illustrate, let's take a look at some of the Principles of War (or Military Art).

PRINCIPLES OF WAR (OR MILITARY ART)

<u>USA</u>	<u>United Kingdom</u>	<u>Soviet Union</u>	<u>France</u>
● Objective	● Aim/Goal	● Mobility/Tempo	● Flexibility
● Offensive	● Coordination	● Concentration	● Concentration
● Mass	● Offensive	● Surprise	● Surprise
● Economy of Force	● Freedom of Action	● Combat Activeness	
● Maneuver	● Concentration	● Preservation of Combat Effectiveness	
● Unity of Command	● Economy of Efforts	● Conformity of Goal/Plan to Actual Situation	
● Security	● Surprise	● Coordination/Interworking	
● Surprise	● Security		
● Simplicity	● Morale		
	● Control of Rear		

CRITIQUE

- A list of principles does not reveal how individual principles interact nor the mechanism for doing so.
- Scientific laws and principles are the same for all countries and seem to change little over time. On the other hand, we note that the Principles of War are different for different countries and change more dramatically over time.
- This would suggest that the principles are not principles. Instead, they seem to be some kind of a (shifting) static check or laundry list of what should be adhered to.

ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITY

- With this critique in mind, if we still feel we need some guidance why not evolve statements that reflect the essence of conflict dynamics in a connected sense

or put another way

- Why not collect appropriate bits and pieces and assemble them in a coherent way to present a more satisfying picture.

APPROPRIATE BITS AND PIECES

- Compress own time and stretch-out adversary time.
- Generate unequal, or asymmetric, distributions of effort for local superiority and decisive leverage.
- Diminish own friction (or entropy) and magnify adversary friction (or entropy).
- Generate a mismatch of effort in mind - time - space.
- Splinter adversary organism and bring about his collapse.

NOW ALTOGETHER

Central Theme (Ch'i/Schwerpunkt)

- Create and exploit unequal, or asymmetric, distributions of moral, mental, and physical effort to:
 - Diminish own friction and magnify adversary friction in order to:
 - Compress own time as well as stretch-out adversary time to shape and adapt to circumstances, thereby:
- Generate decisive mismatches of effort in mind-time-space to splinter adversary organism and bring about his collapse.

Supporting Activity (Cheng/Nebenpunkte)

- Create and exploit atmospheres of menace-uncertainty-mistrust, ambiguity-ambivalence-deception, fast transient maneuvers, unbalanced efforts, etc., as basis to generate mind-time-space mismatches.

Critical Time (T_c)

"Using mathematical methods, it is possible to obtain quantitative estimates of the mobility of control. This task has been resolved by introducing the concept of critical time T_c . This is understood to be the time after which the troop operations will not lead to the assigned goal in general or to the effectiveness which was expected and planned. By using this indicator it is possible to answer the question what it means to control efficiently. This means to see that the sum of time spent on the control cycle, T_{con} , and the time needed by the troops to perform an order received, T_o , is less than the critical time, i.e., the following inequality must be observed: $T_{con} + T_o < T_c$."